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THE IMPACT OF ANALYST-INDUCED MISINFORMATION ON  
THE REQUIREMENTS ELICITATION PROCESS1  
Radha Appan 
Nance College of Business Administration, Cleveland State University, 2121 Euclid Avenue, 
Cleveland, OH 44115 U.S.A. {r.appan@csuohio.edu} 
Glenn J. Browne 
Rawls College of Business Administration, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX  79409 U.S.A. {glenn.browne@ttu.edu} 
Information requirements determination (IRD) is concerned with developing accurate requirements for a 
proposed system, primarily by eliciting information from users and other organizational stakeholders.  In this 
paper we build and test theory concerning a significant threat to the accuracy of information requirements, 
termed the misinformation effect. Misinformation is distorted, false, or other erroneous or misleading 
information that does not reflect the true state of the world or state of mind of the person communicating the 
information. The misinformation effect refers to the tendency of people to recall misleading or false information 
introduced to them following an event instead of original material learned or observed at the time the event 
occurred. During user–analyst communication in the IRD process, analysts may introduce misinformation in 
their discussions with users. We use the misinformation effect literature to hypothesize that in such circum-
stances users are likely to recall misinformation introduced by analysts rather than their true beliefs and 
knowledge of facts. Additionally, we use literature in social psychology to hypothesize that the misinformation 
effect will be stronger when misinformation is introduced using a social technique rather than a nonsocial 
technique. We conducted an experiment to test the misinformation effect in the requirements elicitation 
process. Results indicated that (1) introduction of misinformation reduces the accuracy of requirements 
provided by users, and (2) social techniques (interviews) are more vulnerable to the misinformation effect than 
nonsocial techniques (surveys).  Our research contributes to the information systems literature by identifying 
an important reason that requirements provided by users may be inaccurate, and to IRD practice by identifying 
important dilemmas caused by the misinformation effect as well as potential solutions.  We also contribute to 
the psychology literature by demonstrating the existence of the misinformation effect with users’ experiential 
factual knowledge and beliefs in a business context, and by aiding in understanding the underlying causes of 
the misinformation effect. We discuss implications of our findings and directions for future research to address 
challenges resulting from the misinformation effect. 
Keywords: Information requirements determination, misinformation effect, user–analyst communication, user 
participation, elicitation techniques, systems development 



















Systems development success is highly contingent on the 
accuracy of requirements gathered from users and other stake­
holders during the information requirements determination 
(IRD) process (Davis 1982; Hickey and Davis 2004; 
Wetherbe 1991).  The accuracy of requirements depends in 
large part on the effectiveness of the communication between 
the systems analyst and the users (Bostrom 1989; Gallivan 
and Keil 2003; Hanssen and Faegre 2008; He and King 2008; 
Valusek and Fryback 1987). In this paper we build and test 
theory concerning a significant threat to the accuracy of infor­
mation requirements that occurs during user–analyst com­
munication, termed the misinformation effect. 
Misinformation refers to distorted, false, or other erroneous or 
misleading information that does not reflect the true state of 
the world or true state of mind of the person communicating 
the information (Fox 1983; Zhou and Zhang 2007).  Misinfor­
mation is a general phenomenon in human behavior, as people 
provide misinformation unintentionally or intentionally (that 
is, by lying) all the time (see, e.g., DePaulo et al. 1996). The 
misinformation effect refers to the tendency to recall mis­
leading or false post-event information instead of original 
material learned or observed at the time an event occurred 
(Loftus 1979, 2005; Loftus, Miller, and Burns 1978; Saunders 
and MacLeod 2002). Research has demonstrated that the 
introduction of cues containing misinformation (misleading or 
erroneous information), for example, to an eyewitness to an 
event, can lead to subsequent recall of this misinformation 
rather than the information that was originally observed and 
committed to memory (Gabbert et al. 2004; Johnson 1994; 
Saunders and MacLeod 2002).  The effect has been investi­
gated extensively in the context of eyewitness memory, 
memory for autobiographical events, memory for semantic 
information (e.g., word pairs), and memory of customers for 
product-related stimuli.  However, the impact of the misinfor­
mation effect on an individual’s beliefs and his or her ability 
to recall factual information learned over a period of time, 
which are the types of information elicited during IRD, have 
not been investigated. 
Requirements determination is a key stage of systems 
development, since so many subsequent activities depend on 
accurate requirements. There are numerous methodologies 
that can be applied to gather requirements, and different 
assumptions are made in each methodology.  In this paper, we 
research the situation in which a systems analyst has primary 
control over the requirements determination process and 
elicits requirements from traditional software users.  Regard­
less of methodological approach and assumptions, there are 
several reasons to believe that the IRD process is highly 
vulnerable to the misinformation effect.  First, analysts and 
users often have different mental models and speak “different 
languages,” both of which increase the likelihood of 
communicating misinformation (Alvarez 2002; Bednar and 
Welch 2008; Bostrom 1989; Browne and Ramesh 2002; 
Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Second, requirements elicitation 
necessarily requires considerable recall of information by 
users, regardless of whether they are being interviewed or 
surveyed or are reacting to prototypes (Byrd et al. 1992; 
Davis 1982; Jain et al. 2003; Moody et al. 1998).  As noted, 
recall processes have been shown to be vulnerable to the 
misinformation effect.  Finally, for motivational reasons, 
analysts may consciously or subconsciously introduce mis­
information to influence users to agree with them (Alvarez 
2002; Lin and Silva 2005; Markus and Bjørn-Andersen 1987; 
Myers and Young 1997; Robey and Markus 1984). Thus, it 
is critical to examine the potential impact of misinformation 
on the information acquired during IRD.  If the misinforma­
tion effect is observed, it will have important implications for 
the design of elicitation techniques, strategies for technique 
selection, user participation during IRD, and user–analyst 
communication in general. 
Our investigation has three goals. First, we use the misinfor­
mation effect literature to develop our own theoretical basis 
to argue that when asked to provide requirements, users are 
likely to recall misinformation introduced by analysts rather 
than their true beliefs and knowledge of facts.  Second, we 
seek to develop an improved understanding of the misinfor­
mation effect by exploring the underlying causes of the 
phenomenon during the requirements elicitation process. 
Specifically, we explore whether the phenomenon is due to 
inherent cognitive limitations of humans (Loftus 1979) or is 
caused by the common desire of individuals to appear to be in 
agreement with others (Tajfel and Turner 1986).  Third, we 
investigate the differences between social (interviews) and 
nonsocial (surveys) elicitation techniques when misinforma­
tion is present. All three goals are aimed at building and 
testing theory. The first and third goals have not been 
investigated empirically before in any context.  The second 
goal is new to the systems development literature and will 
help build a better theoretical understanding of various 
phenomena in IRD and systems development generally. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
sections provide background and describe our theoretical 
argument as to why the IRD process is susceptible to the 
misinformation effect.  Next, the methodology for the study 
is described, followed by the results of an experiment.  The 


















Information Requirements Determination in
Systems Development 
Information requirements determination is the process by 
which systems analysts assess and model the needs for a 
proposed information system (Davis 1982; Wetherbe 1991). 
In most systems development efforts, the primary source of 
requirements is people who use the current system and/or who 
will use the proposed system.  Common methods for eliciting 
requirements include personal interviews, surveys or ques­
tionnaires, observation, joint application development (JAD) 
sessions, and protocol analysis (Goguen and Linde 1993; 
Kendall and Kendall 2010; Liou and Chen 1994; Robertson 
and Robertson 1999).  The requirements determination pro­
cess thus may involve both social (e.g., interviews) and 
nonsocial (e.g., surveys) techniques. 
Studies that have emphasized the role of analysts in facili­
tating and improving requirements elicitation have focused 
primarily on the elicitation techniques that can be employed, 
such as structured and unstructured interviews, protocol 
analysis, laddered grids, and card sorting (Agarwal and 
Tanniru 1990; Burton et al. 1987; Moody et al. 1998). 
Although these studies recognize the need to understand how 
humans store and use knowledge to facilitate recall of 
accurate requirements (Best 1989), they do not emphasize the 
need to understand factors that inhibit users’ ability to provide 
accurate requirements.  Although there are many possible 
causes of inaccurate requirements (e.g., lack of communica­
tion among the relevant parties, inability of users to articulate 
requirements, unwillingness of users to provide require­
ments), misinformation potentially inhibits accurate require­
ments, and that is our focus in the current study. 
Requirements can be elicited throughout the systems devel­
opment process, and new requirements sometimes emerge 
even late in the process. In systems development methodo­
logies that use well-defined stages, typically termed waterfall 
or planned methods, the primary requirements gathering 
occurs during the analysis phase, after systems planning and 
selection and before systems design (George et al. 2006). In 
development methodologies often referred to collectively as 
agile, requirements are gathered on an on-going basis as users 
react to prototypes or other types of models of the proposed 
software (e.g., Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004; Beck 1999; 
Boehm 2002; Lee and Xia 2010) (although it should be noted 
that even agile methods typically start by gathering a basic set 
of requirements).  Both waterfall and agile methods are used 
extensively in contemporary systems development.  Although 
agile methods have grown in popularity over the past decade 
and continue to grow, industry surveys show that the waterfall 
methodology is still used in a large majority of systems 
development projects; mature agile development methods are 
reportedly used in only 15 to 25 percent of projects (Light 
2009; Norton 2008). As a basic psychological phenomenon, 
the misinformation effect, if it occurs, should be present in 
any type of development methodology.  However, in the pre­
sent research we assume the use of a waterfall methodology. 
We include implications of our findings for agile methodo­
logies in the discussion section. 
User–Analyst Communication in IRD 
The success of the IRD process depends to a great extent on 
users and other stakeholders communicating accurate 
requirements to analysts.  Prior studies have emphasized the 
importance of user participation for improving the IRD 
process and ultimate system success (Hunton and Beeler 
1997; Hwang and Thorn 1999; Newman and Sabherwal 
1996). However, empirical results of studies examining the 
role of user participation have been mixed, and researchers 
now recognize that the impact of user participation is 
dependent upon numerous contingency factors (Gallivan and 
Keil 2003; Hartwick and Barki 1994; Hunton and Beeler 
1997; McKeen et al. 1994).  One such factor that has been 
recognized as essential for productive user participation is 
effective communication between users and analysts.  How­
ever, models of user participation usually assume that effec­
tive communication occurs and thus do not fully describe the 
user–analyst communication process (Gallivan and Keil 2003; 
Hartwick and Barki 2001; Hunton and Beeler 1997; Newman 
and Noble 1990; Robey et al. 1989). 
Gallivan and Keil (2003) proposed a four-stage process model 
of communication between users and analysts.  In their model, 
the first two stages of the communication (users formulate the 
message and users transmit the message) primarily involve 
users’ cognition, while the last two stages (analysts receive 
and interpret the message, and analysts set priorities and take 
action) involve the cognitions and behavior of analysts. One 
important consideration not highlighted by Gallivan and Keil 
is that users’ formulation of the message to be communicated 
to the analysts is affected by the cues used by the analysts. 
Specifically, users’ formulation of the message is largely 
contingent on their ability to recall relevant information, and 
their ability to recall relevant information is influenced by the 
cues provided by the analysts.  Any erroneous information 
(misinformation) in the cues provided by the analyst could 
result in users providing inaccurate requirements consistent 
with the misinformation in the cues.  This inaccurate infor­
mation may then make its way into requirements documents 














The misinformation effect has traditionally been examined in 
the context of eyewitnesses’ memory for the details of a 
witnessed event.  The misinformation effect involves mis­
reporting of information as a result of exposure to misleading 
information received after the actual event (Loftus et al. 
1989).  For example, a pedestrian who witnesses an auto 
accident (event of interest) may be interviewed by the police 
after the accident. During the interview (post-event), the 
interviewer may incorrectly suggest (e.g., in a leading ques­
tion) that the vehicle involved in the accident encountered a 
stop sign, when in fact only a yield sign was present. During 
subsequent interviews, the eyewitness is likely to recall the 
stop sign rather than the yield sign (Loftus, Miller, and Burns 
1978). This exemplifies the misinformation effect. 
Much research has demonstrated that exposure to post-event 
information can lead to distortion of eyewitnesses’ memories 
(Bekerian and Bowers 1983; Belli 1988; Bonto and Payne 
1991; Ceci et al. 1988; Wagenaar and Boer 1987; Zaragoza et 
al. 1987). The findings of this stream of research have had 
important implications for the legal system, which recognizes, 
for example, the need to sequester witnesses while others 
testify to avoid memory impairment (Federal Rules of Evi­
dence §615).  Evidence of the misinformation effect in the 
eyewitness memory paradigm has triggered research in 
several other domains interested in human memory and recall. 
For instance, research on autobiographical memory has 
demonstrated that inconsistent information learned subsequent 
to the original event can explain some of the common errors 
that arise during recall of autobiographical events (Neisser 
1981; Schooler and Tanaka 1991).  Similar results have been 
found in studies involving tests of memory for semantic infor­
mation (Saunders and MacLeod 2002).  Recently, findings 
from the misinformation literature have been extended to 
studies on advertising. In this context, it has been found that 
post-experience advertisements alter episodic information 
learned by a consumer during direct experience (e.g., tasting 
a sample of orange juice), and thus the misinformation effect 
concept has had important implications for social policy on 
deceptive advertising (Braun and Loftus 1998; Cowley and 
Janus 2004). In sum, numerous empirical studies have estab­
lished the presence of the misinformation effect during recall, 
and there is little doubt that misleading information presented 
to people leads to erroneous reporting of actual event-related 
information. 
Although the IRD process relies to a great extent on the 
ability of users to recall accurate requirements, the implica­
tions of the misinformation effect on requirements gathered 
The IRD process during IRD have not been examined.  
involves recall not only from episodic memory (similar to 
what is examined in the eyewitness memory and other para­
digms) but also beliefs of users formed over a period of time 
and knowledge of facts gained through their experiences. 
Since experiential factual knowledge and beliefs have not 
been investigated to date in the misinformation effect litera­
ture, simply applying the findings of that literature to the IRD 
context is inappropriate.  Further, as we noted in the intro­
duction and elaborate upon in the next section, the nature of 
the IRD process makes it highly vulnerable to the misinfor­
mation effect. 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
Misinformation Effect and IRD 
The success of the IRD process hinges on two groups:  the 
users who possess the relevant information and the analysts 
who generally trigger, direct, and control the process (Alvarez 
2002; Tan 1994). Using a variety of elicitation techniques, 
analysts direct users’ attention toward relevant and critical 
issues (Alvarez 2002; Beath and Orlikowski 1994; Davidson 
2002; Tan 1994).  Given the role of analysts during this 
process, it is possible that they may introduce, intentionally or 
unintentionally, misleading or false information.  The chance 
of introducing this misinformation is significant since analysts 
and users often do not share common mental models and 
interpretive schemes (Alvarez 2002; Bostrom 1989; Davidson 
2002; Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Walz et al. 1993).  For 
example, Davidson (2002) noted that different technological 
frames of reference of users and analysts direct their attention 
and cause information to be filtered in particular ways during 
IRD, ultimately affecting their understanding of the require­
ments.  Also, analysts and users often possess different back­
grounds, since analysts are trained in information systems and 
allied fields while users are trained in functional business 
domains.  Differing mental models, backgrounds, and goals 
often cause misunderstandings and lead to difficulties in 
interpreting information conveyed by one person to another, 
which may result in the unintentional introduction of misin­
formation (Bednar and Welch 2008).  Analysts may also 
simply make mistakes in their discussions with users that 
cause misinformation to be introduced unintentionally. 
In addition, analysts may intentionally introduce misinforma­
tion (sometimes referred to as disinformation; Hernon 1995). 
When misinformation is introduced intentionally, it is related 
to the concept of deception (see Buller and Burgoon 1996; 
DePaulo et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2001).  In IRD, for 
example, the goals of analysts can lead them to intentionally 
withhold information or introduce misinformation during the 












IRD process. For instance, while users may desire a user-
friendly interface, analysts may focus on compatibility with 
existing IS infrastructure (Lin and Silva 2005; see also Robey 
and Markus 1984), and analysts may intentionally introduce 
misinformation to convince users to agree with analysts’ 
goals. Further, the differing backgrounds and mental models 
of analysts and users noted above may also cause one party or 
both (analysts or users—a point to which we return in the 
“Discussion” section) to exploit the knowledge differences to 
intentionally introduce misinformation. 
The IRD process is particularly vulnerable to the intentional 
introduction of misinformation because analysts usually have 
primary control over the process.  There are many examples 
discussed in the literature of opportunities for analysts to use 
their control to influence user requirements (in a variety of 
ways, including introducing misinformation).   For example, 
as noted by Alvarez (2002, p. 103), 
the analyst is poised to control the interview, ask the 
questions and determine what gets talked about…. 
they identify what constitutes information, what gets 
documented and included as a requirement.  They 
assume the gatekeeper role to some degree which 
provides them with authority to make decisions 
about the shape and form of the new information 
system. 
Similar observations have been made by numerous other 
authors (e.g., Beath and Orlikowski 1994, p. 372; Markus and 
Bjørn-Andersen 1987, p. 499). Robey and Markus (1984, pp. 
10-11) provide a vivid description of the potential for 
intentional introduction of misinformation by analysts when 
they control the process: 
For example, in performing the feasibility study… 
systems professionals may strategically state 
“truths” about project costs and requirements.  Their 
expert knowledge and position in the cycle allows 
them to represent data about user needs, implemen­
tation alternatives, and cost–benefit analyses in ways 
that may be advantageous for themselves and 
disadvantageous for users. 
There is also case study evidence available concerning 
analyst-introduced misinformation in systems development 
practice. For example, Lin and Silva (2005, p. 58) describe 
the following findings in their case study of the adoption of 
e-mail software in an organization. 
Through engaging the user group in a discussion of 
the definition of the e-mail system and its technical 
feasibility, the project team successfully changed the 
user group’s initial choice [BeyondMail] to Group 
Wise.  Our data show that the project team deliber­
ately used abstract concepts and technical jargon to 
muddy the user group’s understanding of the project 
and their expectations of the new system. 
Urquhart (2001) provides a second example of the potential 
introduction of misinformation.  In describing a user’s con­
cerns about his relationship with the systems analyst, Urqu­
hart (2001, p. 255) states “he clearly felt at a disadvantage 
when dealing with an IT section that seemed to use their 
expertise as a defence.” She goes on to quote the user as 
follows: 
there is always this big mystery about what goes on 
in Information Services and you’re really, in a lot of 
cases, in a take it or leave sort of situation because 
you don’t have the expertise or the knowledge to 
argue the position and say “it’s not that hard, why 
don’t you just do this, this, and this?”  You’ve really 
got to take it at face value what you’re told, and that 
might be because they simply don’t want to do it. 
In summary, this background provides ample evidence for the 
potential occurrence of the misinformation effect during the 
IRD process. We now use this discussion to develop our first 
set of hypotheses concerning potential misinformation effects. 
We have demonstrated the theoretical vulnerability of the IRD 
process to misinformation.  The prior research on the misin­
formation effect in the psychology literature described above 
leads us to hypothesize that analyst-introduced misinforma­
tion will result in lower accuracy of information provided by 
users. Because facts and beliefs are both important aspects of 
users’ domain knowledge, and because the misinformation 
effect may impact them differently, we have generated 
separate hypotheses for the two constructs.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized2 that 
H1a: In responding to factual questions, users who have 
received misinformation from analysts are more 
likely to provide inaccurate answers than those who 
did not receive any misinformation. 
H1b: In responding to belief-related statements, users 
who have received misinformation from analysts are 
more likely to provide responses that are aligned 
with the misinformation than those who did not 
receive any misinformation. 
2All hypotheses are stated in the alternative form. 

















Examining the role of the misinformation effect during IRD 
can provide useful insights into the reasons for inaccurate 
requirements that are often gathered during systems devel­
opment.  However, to understand the consequences of the 
misinformation effect and how best to prevent their occur­
rence, it is important to understand the mechanisms under­
lying the effect.  The next section explores the causes of the 
misinformation effect identified in the literature and presents 
relevant hypotheses in the context of this study. 
Potential Causes of the Misinformation 
Effect During the IRD Process 
Although the misinformation effect is well established as a 
psychological phenomenon, no consensus has emerged 
regarding its interpretation.  There has been considerable 
debate as to whether people who receive misleading infor­
mation genuinely believe it.  In studying the causes, most 
researchers have viewed misinformation as either a purely 
cognitive phenomenon or as a social psychological 
phenomenon. 
Taking a cognitive perspective, Loftus and her colleagues 
(e.g., Loftus et al. 1989; Loftus et al. 1978) argued that 
misinformation “updates” the previously formed memory for 
an event such that the memory trace of the event detail is 
overwritten and destroyed and the representation of the mis­
information becomes an inseparable part of the original 
memory.  They posit that misinformation reduces the person’s 
ability to remember event details and results in memory 
impairment (Lindsay 1990). The tests used under this para­
digm usually involve a three-stage procedure for studying 
eyewitnesses’ reactions to misleading information. Subjects 
are first shown the visual event (in the form of pictures or 
video), then receive a narrative that contains misleading 
suggestions about the event details, and finally take a memory 
test for those event details (Lindsay 1990).  Research has 
demonstrated that individuals exposed to misleading infor­
mation are likely to report such misinformation confidently on 
subsequent memory tests. 
The memory impairment hypothesis advocated by Loftus and 
her colleagues was challenged by subsequent researchers who 
hypothesized alternative mechanisms that could explain the 
misinformation effect.  McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) chal­
lenged the memory impairment hypothesis based on several 
different arguments, including a demand effect argument.  The 
demand effect refers to the tendency of participants to respond 
to stimuli in a manner consistent with what they perceive to 
be the expectations of the experimenter (Weinberg et al. 
Participants often adjust their responses to maintain 1983). 
social desirability. McCloskey and Zaragoza suggested that 
subjects exposed to misinformation would perform worse than 
those in a control condition even in the absence of any mem­
ory impairment suggested by Loftus et al. (1978).  Further, 
they contended that subjects in the misinformation experi­
ments were often led to believe that the narrative was accurate 
and/or were told that the narrative was developed by a 
professor who had carefully viewed the slides. Therefore, 
simply to demonstrate to the experimenter that they were 
paying attention during the experiment and remembered the 
event details from the slides as well as the narrative, or simply 
to align themselves with the perceived expectations of the 
experimenter, subjects may base their responses on informa­
tion they knew was obtained from the narrative (Lindsay 
1990; Weingardt et al. 1995).  Through a series of empirical 
studies, McCloskey and Zaragoza claimed to have demon­
strated that the memory for an original event is not updated or 
impaired by the introduction of misinformation.  Later 
researchers concluded that McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985; 
Zaragoza et al. 1987) findings were largely the result of the 
demand effect (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Weingardt et al. 1995). 
In an effort to circumvent the demand characteristics issue, 
Lindsay (1990) developed a new procedure based on what is 
termed the “logic of opposition” paradigm, which is useful in 
determining the extent to which demand characteristics con­
tribute to a phenomenon under study.  The “opposition” refers 
to providing subjects with information and then asking them 
to ignore that information in a subsequent recall task (Lindsay 
1990). Lindsay’s new procedure involved three phases. The 
first two phases, showing pictures of the original event and 
presenting a narrative that contained misinformation about the 
original event, were similar to previous procedures employed 
to investigate misinformation.  However, during the third 
phase, which involves the test of memory for details of the 
original event, subjects were instructed that any information 
obtained from the narrative was incorrect and should not be 
reported in the memory test (i.e., subjects were told to ignore 
the misinformation previously introduced) (Weingardt et al. 
1994). Given the warning to ignore the narrative, demand 
characteristics conflict with genuine memory impairment 
(Weingardt et al. 1995). That is, demand effects in this case 
should result in subjects ignoring the misinformation so as to 
conform to the instructions.  However, the results of Lind­
say’s study revealed that subjects sometimes remembered 
suggested details without being able to remember their source 
and based their responses on the misinformation from the 
narrative despite the warning to ignore such misinformation. 
These results, along with findings from other research (e.g., 
Belli 1989; Weingardt et al. 1983; Weinberg et al. 1995), 
established that the misinformation effect is not simply due to 
the demand effect and that misinformation has the potential to 




















Given the findings in other contexts that misinformation may 
be due to both memory impairment and demand effects, we 
argue that it is essential to examine both explanations in the 
IRD context. However, there are differences between other 
contexts and IRD.  Unlike participants in eyewitness memory 
and other paradigms, users’ factual knowledge in the IRD 
context is often a result of multiple exposures over long 
periods of time.  Thus, we hypothesize that it is unlikely that 
a user’s memory for such factual knowledge will be updated 
by the introduction of misinformation.  However, beliefs are 
more subjective in nature and relatively more malleable. 
Thus, misinformation received from a reliable source is more 
likely to influence one’s beliefs.  Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that 
H2a: Memory impairment does not explain the influence 
of misinformation on the accuracy of factual 
requirements provided by users. 
H2b: Memory impairment explains the influence of 
misinformation on belief-related requirements pro-
vided by users. 
Based on the theory and findings from the psychology 
literature, the demand effect is also likely to be present in the 
IRD context. When the systems analyst controls the process, 
users are more likely to provide answers that they believe 
conform to analysts’ preferred views (Alvarez 2002; Lin and 
Silva 2005; Silva and Backhouse 2003).  It is possible that 
users may report misinformation introduced by analysts 
during IRD despite knowing that it is inconsistent with their 
true knowledge or beliefs simply to conform to the perceived 
expectations of the analysts or to avoid appearing to be 
incompetent (see Alvarez 2002).   Thus, we hypothesize that 
H3a: The demand effect explains the influence of misin-
formation on the accuracy of factual requirements 
provided by users. 
H3b: The demand effect explains the influence of misin-
formation on belief-related requirements provided 
by users. 
Requirements Gathering Techniques
and the Misinformation Effect 
As noted in the “Background” section, requirements deter­
mination typically involves both social and nonsocial 
techniques for eliciting requirements.  Our next set of hypoth­
eses concerns the potential impact of these differing tech­
niques on requirements when misinformation is present. 
Most of the studies examining the misinformation effect have 
focused on eyewitnesses’ memory for information presented 
using video clips or narratives. However, very few studies 
have examined the misinformation effect when misinfor­
mation is introduced by a “social source,” often a confederate 
who watches the video along with the participant, discusses 
the details subsequently with him or her, and introduces mis­
information during the course of this discussion (Gabbert et 
al. 2003; Gabbert et al. 2004; Highhouse and Bottrill 1995; 
Wright et al. 2000).  These few studies have found high rates 
(70 to 75 percent) of conformity with the misinformation in 
participants’ responses. However, these studies also ulti­
mately test for the misinformation effect using only a post-
event survey and the focus of inquiry has always been event-
related information recently viewed by the participant. 
The social influence literature provides additional important 
background for elicitation techniques.  It is common for 
people to assume that information shared during a normal 
discussion is accurate and truthful (Gabbert et al. 2004; 
Swann et al. 1982). People also generally want to seem 
agreeable and likeable to others and to avoid appearing to be 
a “trouble maker” (Gabbert et al. 2004), a factor often referred 
to as “social desirability distortion” (Richman et al. 1999).  In 
the context of IRD, since the misinformation may be intro­
duced and subsequently elicited by the same person (the 
analyst), it seems likely that users will conform to the misin­
formation introduced as a way to be agreeable. A variety of 
factors inherent in social techniques could further increase the 
extent of conformity with misinformation.  For instance, in 
social situations additional information is often conveyed 
through nonverbal influences such as eye contact and facial 
expressions, and social cues such as perceived credibility and 
trustworthiness are often present (Gabbert et al. 2004). These 
nonverbal cues can unintentionally change the results in a 
way that is consistent with the expectations of the experi­
menter (Gabbert et al. 2004; Rosenthal 1969).  Gabbert et al. 
(2004) found that a social technique (watching a video of a 
robbery with another person—a confederate—present) 
resulted in more misinformation reported by participants than 
a nonsocial technique (reading a written description of the 
robbery with no one else present). Finally, research in infor­
mation systems and other fields concerning interviews and 
surveys has shown that the two techniques can yield 
qualitatively different responses in a variety of contexts (see 
Cooper and Schindler 2008; Sivo et al. 2005). 
In the current study we examine requirements gathering 
techniques in two ways. First, we investigate the misinfor­
mation effect when misinformation is introduced and sub­
sequently elicited using two elicitation techniques:  (1) a 






















between analyst and user), in this case a structured interview, 
and (2) a nonsocial technique (a technique in which there is 
no direct interaction between the analyst and the user), in this 
case a survey. Both interviews and surveys are commonly 
used in IRD processes (George et al. 2006; Kendall and 
Kendall 2010). Thus, in the present study, all factors except 
the source of misinformation and elicitation mode (social 
versus nonsocial) will be held constant to examine whether 
users are influenced more when misinformation is encoun­
tered as part of an interview or when using a survey 
instrument. Based on the findings in the social influence and 
misinformation effect literatures, we hypothesize that 
H4a:	 The misinformation effect will be greater for factual 
requirements provided by users when misinfor-
mation is introduced and elicited using a social 
technique (interview) rather than a nonsocial tech-
nique (survey). 
H4b:	 The misinformation effect will be greater for belief-
related requirements provided by users when misin-
formation is introduced and elicited using a social 
technique (interview) rather than a nonsocial tech-
nique (survey). 
Additionally, the requirements elicitation process has two 
main objectives: to minimize inaccurate requirements and to 
maximize accurate requirements.  While we posit that social 
techniques are more susceptible to the misinformation effect 
and therefore more likely to produce inaccurate requirements, 
it is also important to investigate whether social techniques 
are more or less likely to generate accurate requirements when 
misinformation is not present. 
Much research supports the view that the personal nature of 
social techniques such as interviews makes participants pay 
more attention to the process, encourages them to think about 
their responses (since they will be responding to someone and 
will not want to be judged poorly by that person), and makes 
them feel more accountable for their responses (see Lerner 
and Tetlock 1999; Levine et al. 1993). Hence, we expect the 
accuracy of requirements that were not subject to misinfor­
mation to be higher with social techniques than with non­
social techniques. That is, although we expect misinfor­
mation to be higher with social techniques (H4a), we also 
expect people to try harder and thus be more accurate con­
cerning requirements about which they have received no 
misinformation.  This yields our final hypothesis: 
H5: A social technique (interview) will result in more 
accurate requirements for factual items about which 
participants received no misinformation than a nonsocial 
technique (survey). 
This hypothesis is important to be able to make meaningful 
recommendations about the selection of elicitation techniques. 
With these hypotheses in mind, we now turn to the 
methodology we used to test them. 
Methodology 
Pilot Test 
Twenty students participated in a pilot test that was conducted 
to (1) identify the critical items to be manipulated during the 
experiment and (2) ensure that subjects understood the 
instrument and were able to complete it without any prob­
lems.  The subjects for the pilot test were drawn from the 
same population as the subjects for the subsequent experi­
ment.  All pilot subjects were assigned to the control con­
dition. Ten students were interviewed while the other ten 
were surveyed. Based on the responses of the participants to 
the different factual questions and belief-related statements, 
four “critical” items (two factual items and two belief-related 
items) were selected for use subsequently as misinformation 
for the treatment conditions in the experiment.  Selection of 
the critical items was based on the pilot participants’ 
responses. Two factual questions for which most participants 
answered correctly were chosen as the two critical factual 
questions. For the two belief-related critical items that were 
chosen, all of the participants strongly disagreed with the 
statements.  That is, all of the participants rated both the 
belief-related items either 1 or 2 on a seven-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  These state­
ments were then included in the treatments, discussed below, 
because pilot subjects believed otherwise (as shown by their 
uniformly low ratings of the items), and we were therefore 
able to use these items to introduce misinformation.  None of 
the students reported any problems during the elicitation 
session. 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 153 students (97 male and 56 female) enrolled in 
the college of business at a large university participated in the 
experiment for extra credit.  Participation in the study was 
voluntary. The study employed a 3 (condition:  control, 
memory impairment, demand effect) × 2 (requirements tech­
nique: interview, survey) between-subjects design.  Each 
subject was randomly assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions. Participants in the interview condition took part 
individually, while those in the survey condition were in a 


















   
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were assigned randomly to one of 
the conditions and were seated in a chair in a private office or 
a larger room, depending on the condition.  The participants 
were welcomed by an interviewer who introduced herself as 
an analyst working with the university’s IT department for the 
Student Information System Upgrade Project (the analyst 
[interviewer] was a 26-year-old female who wore business 
casual attire and conducted the interviews in a professional 
manner).  Because she introduced herself as an analyst, 
conducted the sessions, and provided the instructions, it was 
clear to participants that she was controlling the process; thus, 
consistent with the theory and empirical findings noted 
earlier, the demand effect was expected to be present. 
This university uses a student information system that allows 
students to perform a variety of tasks, such as add and drop 
classes, view and print class schedules, manage accounts, 
request transcripts, forward campus e-mail, and view midterm 
and final grades. The system had not been upgraded for at 
least four years prior to this study.  All subjects participated 
during a period of two weeks, and no system upgrades 
occurred during this period. Students are required to register 
for courses every semester using this system and also to use 
the system as the primary mode for checking grades, paying 
fees, purchasing parking tickets, etc. Thus, students are 
appropriate participants in this study because they are regular 
users of the system, have current knowledge of the system, 
and have a real motivation for its improvement.  The parti­
cipants were asked to log in to the student information system 
using their personal user name and password.  A booklet con­
taining instructions and a series of three short warm-up tasks 
to be performed on the system were given to the participants. 
None of these tasks pertained to the questions that were to be 
used with the participants subsequently.  This phase was 
included to ensure that the participants were familiar with the 
information system.  All participants completed the tasks 
without any problems. 
The participants were then introduced to the purpose of the 
session.  They were told that the university and the system 
developers were interested in improving the student infor­
mation system and thus were interested in gathering infor­
mation and opinions from students, who are the primary users 
of the system.  Participants did not complete consent forms 
prior to the experimental sessions; they believed they were 
participating in an actual system upgrade process (consent 
forms are not required at this university for research exempt 
from full review by the Human Subjects Committee).  During 
the introduction phase, the participants in the two treatment 
conditions (memory impairment and demand effect) were 
provided with misinformation about two factual features of 
the system and two other pieces of misinformation aimed at 
influencing their beliefs about the system (participants in the 
control condition were not supplied with any misinforma­
tion).3 These four pieces of misinformation were the critical 
items referred to above.  The misinformation suggested that 
•	 Students could pay tuition using a credit card free of 
charge (whereas in fact they have to pay an additional fee 
for paying tuition with a credit card) 
•	 The student information system is available 24 hours a 
day (whereas in fact it is not available from midnight to 
7:00 a.m.) 
•	 The student information system has a slow response time 
(whereas it is generally believed to be a fast system— 
confirmed during the pilot test, when pilot subjects all 
strongly disagreed that it is a slow system) 
•	 The student information system is well utilized by the 
faculty members (whereas it is generally believed that the 
faculty members do not use the system effectively— 
confirmed during the pilot test, during which pilot 
subjects all strongly disagreed that faculty members 
utilize the system effectively)4 
After the introduction, participants answered demographic 
questions and were asked to rate several statements aimed at 
assessing their familiarity with the information system. Parti­
cipants were then introduced to the last phase of the session, 
which contained two sets of questions: first, there were 11 
factual questions about the features of the student information 
system, and, second, there were 13 questions aimed at 
3The misinformation provided concerned the “as-is” system rather than the 
“to-be” system.  Subjects were told explicitly that information was being 
gathered about the current system to identify current potential problems so 
they could be addressed in the upgrade of the system.  We used the as-is 
system because users are typically better at articulating information about 
what they already do than they are at envisioning what a proposed system 
should do.  A new system involves changes of some type (typically to busi­
ness processes) and causes uncertainty in the minds of users (Joshi 1991). 
We believe that misinformation effects are likely to be stronger when 
discussing to-be systems since users are probably less certain about the 
technologies involved and will thus be more vulnerable to misinformation 
introduced by analysts (and thus the results of the current study can be 
considered a lower bound). 
4All of these critical items are potentially relevant to a system upgrade since 
they impact usage and perceptions about the current system.  Students and 
faculty use the system for many purposes.  Factual questions about the 
current system are important because if students do not know about current 
features, it may be because they do not use them or value them.  Belief-
related questions are important because of the impact of perceptions on 
system usage. 



















gathering the beliefs of the participants regarding the func­
tionality of the system.  Participants answered the first set of 
questions by indicating yes or no and answered the second set 
of questions on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly dis­
agree to 7 = strongly agree).  Each set of questions contained 
two critical questions (noted above) that were aimed at 
studying the effect of misinformation on participants’ 
responses. The use of two critical questions (out of 11 for 
factual items and 13 for belief-related items) is consistent with 
past research on the misinformation effect (e.g., Belli 1989; 
Gabbert et al. 2004; Saunders and MacLeod 2002; Weingardt 
et al. 1995). The introduction of too much misinformation 
can raise suspicions in participants about the veracity of the 
cover story. 
The logic of opposition paradigm was employed to test the 
memory impairment hypothesis (i.e., misinformation updates 
the initial memories of subjects).  Before the final recall phase 
(the factual and belief-related questions), participants in this 
condition were instructed that any information obtained 
during the introductory phase was wrong and should not be 
reported in the final memory test.  Under such opposition 
instructions, even if demand characteristics are in operation, 
they will lead the users to prod their memories for correct 
answers (Weingardt et al. 1995).  Accordingly, subjects in the 
memory impairment treatment condition received the fol­
lowing additional instructions before answering the two sets 
of questions: 
To ensure that you are familiar with the XXX 
system, we need to ask you some questions.  For 
some of the questions, the answers were not men­
tioned in the introduction section. For other ques­
tions, the answers were mentioned in the intro­
duction section, but were described inaccurately. 
There is no question on this survey for which the 
correct answer was provided in the introduction. 
Therefore, please answer the following questions to 
the best of your ability without relying on the infor­
mation provided in the introduction section. 
These instructions were adapted from Lindsay (1990) to suit 
the context of this study.  After participants answered the two 
sets of questions (concerning the fact and belief statements), 
the interviewer asked them if they would like to provide any 
other feedback about the system.  Participants were then 
asked to review the information they had provided to the 
interviewer, make any changes they desired, and sign at the 
end of the booklet in which the interviewer had recorded their 
answers. They were then debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. Sessions with participants generally lasted 20 
to 25 minutes. 
The participants in the survey condition followed the same 
procedure but were given booklets with instructions and tasks 
that they performed by themselves.  They had no interaction 
with the interviewer and misinformation was introduced as a 
part of the introductory section in the first booklet.  Partici­
pants were allowed to work through the booklets at their own 
pace. 
All participants, regardless of treatment condition, completed 
the study in three different sections. Participants in the survey 
technique completed each booklet, turned it in, and received 
the next booklet. Participants in the interview technique were 
read the same materials in three different sections of the 
interview. Thus, there was no opportunity to refer back to the 
cover story or any other material during the experimental 
session. 
Coding 
The 11-item questionnaire containing factual questions was 
scored in terms of the number of neutral questions (noncritical 
items) answered correctly (yielding a score of 0 to 9) and the 
number of critical questions answered incorrectly (yielding a 
misinformation score that ranged from 0 to 2).  For the factual 
questions, these numbers were added to create a misinfor­
mation score for each participant, which is typical in misin­
formation effect studies.  For the questionnaire containing the 
belief statements, however, the response numbers were not 
added. Adding the ratings provided on two different belief 
statements (system response time and effective use by faculty) 
could result in a meaningless misinformation score and thus 
lead to misinterpretation of the results, so the responses were 
used individually to make within-group and between-group 
comparisons. 
Results 
As noted, to ensure that the participants were familiar with the 
information system, they were asked to rate their familiarity 
on a seven-point scale that had anchors of 1 = completely 
unfamiliar and 7 = completely familiar.  The average rating 
for this question was 5.83 (S.D. = 0.91) suggesting that the 
participants believed themselves to be quite familiar with the 
system. Participants were also asked to rate their response to 
a question concerning how often they used the system on a 
seven-point scale that had anchors of 1 = very rarely and 7 = 
very often. The average rating for this question was 4.58 (S.D. 
= 1.25) suggesting that the system utilized in the study is 
commonly used by the participants.  Since no participants 
rated their use of the system as “rarely” (ratings 1 or 2), no 















Does the Misinformation Effect Occur 
in the Context of IRD? 
The misinformation scores calculated for all of the conditions 
were analyzed to determine whether the misinformation effect 
occurred when participants provided responses to the factual 
questions. The scores were based on the number of inac­
curate responses to the critical factual questions and ranged 
from 0 (no inaccurate responses) to 2 (both responses were 
inaccurate). The mean misinformation score was higher for 
participants in the demand effect condition (mean = 1.51; S.D. 
= 0.64) and in the memory impairment condition (mean = 
0.94; S.D. = 0.73) than for those in the control condition 
(mean = 0.35; S.D. = 0.56) (see Table 1). Univariate 
ANOVA was performed to examine the differences between 
the treatment conditions and the control condition for the 
misinformation scores.  The differences were significant 
(F(2,152) = 40.493; p < 0.001) and hence H1a was supported. 
Table 2 summarizes the means and standard deviations of 
participants’ responses to the two critical belief statements. 
On a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree), participants in the control condition had lower 
means, suggesting that they (correctly) disagreed with the two 
critical belief statements.  Participants in the treatment condi­
tions had higher means, suggesting that they were influenced 
by the misinformation while responding to the critical belief 
statements.  Multivariate ANOVA was used to analyze the 
differences. The differences were significant for both belief-
related statements (Item 1: F(2,152) = 25.92, p < 0.001; Item 2: 
F(2,152) = 21.21, p < 0.001) and thus H1b was also supported. 
Therefore, we conclude that the misinformation effect occurs 
during requirements determination. 
Since support for the misinformation effect was found in the 
responses of participants to both factual questions and belief-
related statements, further planned comparisons using the 
Bonferroni procedure were made to understand what causes 
the misinformation effect.  The results of these comparisons 
were used to test H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b, and are discussed 
in the paragraphs that follow. 
Does Memory Impairment Cause
the Misinformation Effect? 
Planned comparisons revealed that participants in the memory 
impairment condition had a significantly higher misinfor­
mation score for the factual questions than those in the control 
condition (p < 0.001).  Therefore, H2a (the memory impair­
ment hypothesis does not explain the influence of misinfor­
mation on responses to factual questions) was not supported. 
We discuss this unanticipated finding in more detail below. 
Participants in the memory impairment condition reported 
beliefs more consistent with the misinformation introduced 
earlier than those in the control condition (Item 1: p = 0.018; 
Item 2:  p = 0.003). Therefore H2b was supported. Based on 
these findings, we conclude that memory impairment is one 
of the causes of the misinformation effect in the context of 
requirements elicitation. 
Does the Demand Effect Cause 
the Misinformation Effect? 
Participants in the demand effect treatment condition had a 
significantly higher misinformation score for the factual 
questions than those in the control condition (p < 0.001). 
Therefore, H3a (demand effect explains the influence of 
misinformation on responses to factual questions) was 
supported. Also, participants in the demand effect condition 
reported beliefs more consistent with the misinformation 
introduced than those in the control condition (Item 1:  p < 
0.001; Item 2:  p < 0.001).  Therefore H3b was also sup­
ported. Further, participants in the demand effect condition 
had a significantly higher misinformation score than those in 
the memory impairment condition (p < 0.001) and reported 
beliefs more consistent with the misinformation when com­
pared to those in the memory impairment condition (Item 1: 
p < 0.001; Item 2: p = 0.006).  Therefore, we conclude that 
(1) the demand effect is an important cause of the misinfor­
mation effect, and (2) in the context of requirements elicita­
tion, though memory impairment contributes to the observed 
misinformation effect, the demand effect is the dominant 
cause of the misinformation effect.5 
5It is worth noting that we did not have an independent measure for the 
demand effect, such as a question to participants about whether they 
responded to items because they believed the interviewer sought or expected 
that answer or whether they reported their true beliefs.  Early research on the 
misinformation effect (e.g., Loftus et al. 1978) included such a question on 
debriefing questionnaires.  However, Weinberg et al. (1983) argued that such 
a question “essentially asks subjects to admit to dishonesty” (p. 102) and 
therefore is a poor measure of potential demand effects. Thus, subsequent 
studies typically omitted such questions and relied instead on inferences 
based on the experimental design. We employed the latter procedure in the 
current experiment.  However, it is important to note that because we did not 
have an independent measure, we cannot confirm that the theoretical 
mechanism underlying participants’ responses was the demand effect.  As in 
many psychological studies, we infer the demand effect explanation due to 
the presence of the analyst who controlled the process and the previous 
literature demonstrating that participants try to conform to the perceived 










Table 1. Summary Statistics for Misinformation Score for Facts* 
Technique Treatment Mean Std. Dev. N 
Interview Control  .27 .53 26 
Demand Effect 1.73 .53 26 
Memory Impairment 1.00 .75 26 
Total 1.00 .85 78 
Survey Control .44 .58 25 
Demand Effect 1.28 .68 25 
Memory Impairment .88 .73 25 
Total .87 .74 75 
Total Control .35 .56 51 
Demand Effect 1.51 .64 51 
Memory Impairment .94 .73 51 
Total .93 .80 153 
*Note:  Misinformation score ranges from 0 to 2 with 0 referring to correct responses to both of the 
critical factual questions and 2 referring to incorrect responses to both of the critical factual questions. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Critical Belief Statements* 
Technique 
Treatment Mean Std.  Deviation N 
Belief Items Item 1 Item 2 Item 1 Item 2 
Interview Control 2.46 3.65 1.39 1.85 26
 Demand Effect 5.96 6.12 1.24 1.07 26
 Memory 
Impairment 
4.58 5.50 2.02 .91 26
 Total 4.33 5.09 2.14 1.70 78 
Survey Control 2.96 4.00 1.62 1.35 25
 Demand Effect 4.44 5.24 1.69 1.20 25
 Memory 
Impairment 
2.76 4.04 1.79 1.59 25
 Total 3.39 4.43 1.84 1.49 75 
Total Control 2.71 3.82 1.51 1.62 51
 Demand Effect 5.22 5.69 1.65 1.21 51
 Memory 
Impairment 
3.69 4.78 2.10 1.47 51
 Total 3.87 4.76 2.05 1.63 153 


















Misinformation Effect and 
Elicitation Techniques 
Participants in the interview condition had a mean misin­
formation score of 1.37 (S.D. = 0.74) and those in the survey 
condition had a mean misinformation score of 1.08 (S.D. = 
0.72).  To examine whether this difference is significant, a 
t-test was conducted on the data from the two treatment 
conditions with elicitation technique as the independent 
variable. Data from the control condition were not included 
for this analysis since those participants did not receive any 
misinformation.6  The difference in the misinformation score 
was significant, with t(100) = 1.97; p = 0.026 (one-tailed). 
Therefore, H4a was supported.  That is, the misinformation 
effect on factual requirements provided by users is greater 
when misinformation is introduced and elicited using the 
interview (social) technique than when using the survey 
(nonsocial) technique. 
In responding to the critical items pertaining to beliefs about 
the system, participants in the interview condition had 
responses more aligned with the misinformation when com­
pared to those in the survey condition. Participants in the 
interview condition had mean responses of 5.27 and 5.81 
(S.D. = 1.81 and 1.03) to the two critical items while those in 
the survey condition had mean responses of 3.60 and 4.64 
(S.D. = 1.92 and 1.52) to the two critical items.  Results of 
multivariate ANOVA showed that the differences were 
significant (Item 1: F(1,101) = 20.51, p < 0.001; Item 2:  F(1,101) 
= 20.74, p < 0.001). Therefore, H4b was also supported. 
Elicitation Techniques and Facts Not
Subject to Misinformation 
To test whether the interview elicitation technique yielded 
more accurate answers than the survey technique for facts not 
subject to misinformation, we utilized participants’ responses 
to the nine neutral questions relating to facts about the student 
information system.  Responses to each of these questions 
were coded as 1 (correct response) or 0 (incorrect response). 
The total number of correct responses provided to the neutral 
questions formed each participant’s accuracy score. 
6Because the control condition was not included in this analysis, the mean 
values for the tests in this section do not appear in Tables 1 and 2.  The mean 
values were calculated from the means for the demand effect and memory 
impairment treatments within each technique (interview and survey).  For 
example, for the interview technique for the factual questions, the mean can 
be calculated in a shorthand fashion as follows: (1.73 + 1.00)/2 = 1.37 
(addition of the treatment means and division by 2 is possible since N is equal 
for the two treatments). 
A t-test was performed comparing the accuracy scores for the 
two groups, interview (mean = 8.71, S.D. = .54) and survey 
(mean = 7.98, S.D. = .89).  The resulting difference was 
highly significant (t(100) = 5.05; p < .0001).  Thus, the social 
interview technique yielded more accurate responses to the 
items not subject to misinformation than the nonsocial survey 
technique, supporting H5. Table 3 provides a summary of the 
hypotheses and results. 
Discussion 
Threats to the accuracy of requirements are of fundamental 
concern in IRD. We have addressed the threat of misinfor­
mation on requirements accuracy in this study by focusing on 
three main issues:  Does the misinformation effect occur in 
the context of gathering requirements about facts and beliefs? 
If the misinformation effect does occur, what is the under­
lying mechanism that causes it?  Does the requirements 
gathering technique of interviewing make users more vulner­
able to the misinformation effect than the survey technique? 
This section provides a discussion of these three main issues 
in terms of both theoretical and practical implications. 
Implications for Theory 
Significant differences between responses of the participants 
in the control and treatment conditions to critical items estab­
lished that the misinformation effect occurs during IRD. 
Misinformation introduced by the analyst influenced users’ 
responses to both factual and belief-related questions irrespec­
tive of the elicitation technique employed.  The results reveal 
a new perspective concerning the accuracy of requirements 
that has not been generally recognized.  That is, one reason 
for inaccurate requirements given by users is likely misinfor­
mation provided by analysts. 
Further, support for H3a and H3b demonstrates that an 
important cause of the misinformation effect in the context of 
IRD is the demand effect.  Participants in the demand effect 
treatment condition performed significantly worse than the 
other participants. They had a significantly higher misinfor­
mation score for factual information and they aligned their 
beliefs more closely to the misinformation than participants in 
the other conditions. Further analysis revealed that although 
memory impairment explains the misinformation effect in 
IRD, the demand effect provides a stronger explanation.  Such 
patterns were also found when comparing responses of parti­
cipants for a given elicitation technique.  Therefore, we con­







Table 3. Hypotheses and Results Summary 
Hypotheses Test Employed Supported/Not Supported 
Between Group Comparisons
H1a: In responding to factual questions, users who have 
received misinformation from analysts are more likely to 
provide inaccurate answers than those who did not 
receive any misinformation. 
ANOVA 
F(2,152) = 40.49; p < 0.001 
Supported 
H1b: In responding to belief-related statements, users 
who have received misinformation from analysts are 
more likely to provide responses that are aligned with the 
misinformation than those who did not receive any 
misinformation. 
MANOVA 
Item 1: F(2,152) = 25.92; p < 0.001 
Item 2: F(2,152) = 21.21; p < 0.001 
Supported 
H2a: Memory impairment does not explain the 
influence of misinformation on the accuracy of factual 
requirements provided by users. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
p < 0.001 
Not Supported 
H2b: Memory impairment explains the influence of 
misinformation on the accuracy of belief related 
requirements provided by users. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Item 1: p = 0.018 
Item 2: p = 0.003 
Supported 
H3a: Demand effect explains the influence of misinfor-
mation on the accuracy of factual requirements provided 
by users. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
p < 0.001 
Supported 
H3b: Demand effect explains the influence of misinfor-
mation on the belief related requirements provided by 
users. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Item 1: p < 0.001 
Item 2: p < 0.001 
Supported 
H4a: Misinformation effect on factual requirements 
provided by users will be greater when misinformation is 
introduced and elicited using social techniques 
(interviews) rather than non-social techniques (surveys). 
T-Test
t(100) = 1.97; p = 0.026 
Supported 
H4b: Misinformation effect on belief related responses 
provided by users will be greater when misinformation is 
introduced and elicited using social techniques 
(interviews) rather than non-social techniques (surveys). 
MANOVA 
Item 1: F(1,101) = 20.51; p < 0.001 
Item 2: F(1,101) = 20.74; p < 0.001 
Supported 
H5: Social techniques (interviews) will result in more 
accurate requirements (for factual items) about which 
participants received no misinformation than nonsocial 
techniques (surveys). 
T-Test 
t(100) = 5.05; p < .0001 
Supported 
primarily due to the demand effect and is further magnified by 
genuine memory impairment. 
These findings provide an integrative theoretical framework 
for understanding previous work on user–analyst communi­
cation. As noted, some research has demonstrated that user 
participation improves requirements determination and system 
success (Hunton and Beeler 1997; Hwang and Thorn 1999; 
Newman and Sabherwal 1996), but findings on the influence 
of user participation have been equivocal.  The misinfor­
mation effect may be one important contingency factor that 
helps explain the differing findings. If analysts intentionally 
or unintentionally introduce misinformation, they undermine 
the process of user participation and hence cannot derive 
benefits from it. 
Lack of support for H2a provides an important perspective on 
the misinformation effect.  We hypothesized that the influence 
of misinformation on responses to factual questions would not 
be caused by memory impairment since it is unlikely that 
memories for factual knowledge gained over a period of time 
will change with the introduction of misinformation.  For 
example, if a user has seen a feature of a system over and over 
again, it is unlikely that he will believe misinformation intro­
duced that contradicts his factual knowledge. However, this 


















a period of time was impacted.  This finding should be of 
considerable concern for all systems development stake­
holders. To attempt to understand the finding further and be 
able to suggest potential mitigating strategies, we conducted 
additional exploratory analysis. Multiple comparisons 
revealed that among the participants interviewed, participants 
in the memory impairment condition had significantly higher 
misinformation scores than those in the control condition 
(p = 0.001). However, among the surveyed participants, there 
was no significant difference in the misinformation scores for 
factual questions for those participants in the control condi­
tion and the memory impairment condition (p = 0.242).  These 
additional findings provide important insights.  Factual 
knowledge learned over time was not affected by memory 
impairment when a survey instrument was utilized, and the 
misinformation effect did not occur, but memory impairment 
and the misinformation effect did occur when interviews were 
utilized. This finding illustrates additional concerns about the 
impact of interviews on accuracy of recall.  We discuss 
potential mitigating strategies later in this section. 
Support for H2b demonstrates that irrespective of the tech­
nique employed, the memory impairment hypothesis explains 
the misinformation effect observed in the responses of users 
to statements of beliefs.  As we discuss below, particular care 
must be taken in elicitation procedures to ensure that sugges­
tive misleading information is not introduced and to be certain 
that users’ true beliefs are assessed. 
Support for H4a and H4b suggests an important implication 
concerning the choice of elicitation techniques.  Although 
interviews conducted with different people are often stan­
dardized, it is important to acknowledge that standardization 
lies on a continuum.  At one end, strict standardization is 
expressed by adherence to prescribed rules and with little 
flexibility for the interviewer, regardless of the characteristics 
of the situation.  At the other end, interviewer autonomy is 
evidenced by flexibility in applying a more limited set of 
rules. The latter is often utilized in cases in which the inter­
viewer needs to clarify a number of factors with the parti­
cipant. In fact, one of the most important advantages of using 
the interview technique is the conversational flexibility it 
provides (Suchman and Jordan 1990).  However, this flexi­
bility has both strengths and weaknesses.  Interviewer probing 
can help users understand requests more fully and produce 
accurate answers, but interviewers can also introduce infor­
mation that leads users to give inaccurate or unintended 
responses (Conrad and Schober 1996). Findings of the pre­
sent study demonstrate that interviews make users more 
susceptible to misinformation when compared to surveys.  In 
fact, we may have established a powerful boundary condition 
since probing was not even performed in the current study (if 
probing had been performed, it would have provided more 
opportunities for the introduction of misinformation by the 
analyst). Thus, it is not just misinformation per se that dis­
torts users’ responses; rather, the medium by which misinfor­
mation is introduced and elicited also has an impact on the 
magnitude of the misinformation effect.  With the social elic­
itation technique, the effect of misinformation on users’ 
responses is stronger. 
However, the results of H5 demonstrate that the social tech­
nique of interviewing leads to higher accuracy of responses to 
neutral questions (participants in the interview condition were 
more accurate than participants in the survey condition for 
neutral factual items).  Together, the results of H4 and H5 
show that interviews lead users to be less accurate for ques­
tions about which they have received misinformation (and 
thus more susceptible to the misinformation effect) when 
compared to surveys, but more accurate in their responses to 
factual questions about which they have received no misin­
formation.  The latter, consistent with the theory presented 
earlier, was presumably a result of greater focus, a stronger 
feeling of accountability, and trying harder to please the 
experimenter. On the other hand, surveys lead users to less 
accurate responses to factual questions about which they have 
received no misinformation but greater accuracy for misin­
formation items.  In the survey condition, we speculate that 
the ability to read questions several times and reflect upon 
them may have led to more accurate answers to the misinfor­
mation items, but the lack of social influence (no experi­
menter present) did not provide the extra motivation to answer 
the neutral items correctly. This explanation concerning the 
survey condition is, however, an empirical question. 
Thus, the findings from H4 and H5 suggest an important 
dilemma when it comes to choosing an elicitation technique. 
Removing interviews from the process reduces the likelihood 
of analyst-introduced misinformation (although it should be 
noted that the wording of questions on a survey can also 
introduce misinformation).  Since surveys seem relatively 
resistant to the misinformation effect, research concerning 
ways of making them more effective in IRD is important.  Our 
findings provide another reason for using multiple techniques 
during IRD.  Analysts might compare the differences in 
requirements gathered through interviews and surveys and 
analyze whether the differences are genuine or are caused by 
misinformation introduced during the process.  Further 
research into this important dilemma is warranted. 
Theoretical implications also exist for alternative forms of 
requirements gathering.  Systems development methods are 
constantly evolving, and agile methodologies have recently 
become more widely used.  Agile methodologies emphasize 
an incremental and iterative approach to systems development 



























Xia 2010).  Each iteration of a system or system component 
yields a workable output to which users can provide feedback 
(Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004).  In theory, this approach 
could reduce misinformation effects that may have occurred 
during the requirements elicitation process by providing more 
opportunities for feedback and greater interaction between 
analysts and users. However, we believe that iterative 
development will not eliminate the misinformation effect. 
First, demand effects will still be present and perhaps will be 
stronger because agile methodologies demand trust among 
team members and compromise when it comes to deciding 
which features are important and which are not.  Such an 
environment may make it easier for analysts to influence 
users’ preferences intentionally or unintentionally.  Also, a 
prototype developed by an analyst is a much stronger signal 
than a textual or verbal suggestion.  If an analyst presents a 
user with a prototype, the user is likely to perceive the proto­
type as demonstrating the analyst’s “expertise” and as a signal 
that the analyst believes it to be a good solution. This is 
likely to induce a demand effect.  Second, memory impair­
ment indicates that the original knowledge or belief of the 
user is “overwritten,” in which case the original memory is 
lost and cannot be retrieved even with several iterations. 
Thus, it seems likely that the misinformation effect will not be 
eliminated with iterative development techniques.  However, 
this is an empirical question worthy of investigation. 
The present research also contributes to theory concerning the 
misinformation effect in several important ways.  As men­
tioned in the “Introduction” section, the presence of the 
misinformation effect when dealing with facts and beliefs 
learned by people over time through experience has not, to 
our knowledge, been tested before in any context. We found 
that both types of information were susceptible to the misin­
formation effect, extending the impact of the effect from the 
traditional contexts of eyewitness testimony and auto­
biographical events to contexts in which people have well-
established knowledge structures in place. The fact that both 
experientially learned information and beliefs are impacted by 
the misinformation effect demonstrates the generality of the 
phenomenon and opens many additional avenues of research 
in requirements elicitation and human memory more 
generally. We have also contributed to an improved under­
standing of the misinformation effect by providing the first 
test of the phenomenon when information was both intro­
duced and elicited using social (interview) and nonsocial 
(survey) techniques.7  As noted, our findings demonstrate the 
7As noted earlier, Gabbert et al. (2004) elicited information using social (a 
confederate) and nonsocial (a narrative) techniques but did not introduce the 
misinformation using social techniques.  Their experiment used the standard 
video clip stimulus in the eyewitness memory paradigm and introduced 
misinformation using written narratives for all conditions. Our study extends 
and expands upon the findings of Gabbert et al. (2004). 
increased impact of the misinformation effect but also the 
increased accuracy for neutral factual items in interview 
settings. Our findings suggest that the magnitude of the 
misinformation effect in traditional contexts such as eye­
witness testimony may be even greater if social elicitation 
techniques are utilized (and thus greater precautions should be 
taken to prevent the effect from impacting testimony). 
Further research on these differences is warranted.  Thus, the 
present research adds significantly to the theory concerning 
the misinformation effect. 
Implications for Practice 
Several important implications for practice are suggested by 
this research. One of the major problems likely to result from 
the misinformation effect is that organizations develop 
systems that do not meet their requirements.  They may pay 
for features they do not need, find that systems they develop 
are not compatible with their existing systems or business 
processes, or discover that requirements were omitted that 
would have been useful for the organization. These implica­
tions suggest that alerting both systems analysts and project 
managers to the possibility of the misinformation effect, and 
using strategies to minimize the effect, are important practical 
prescriptions. 
As noted above, choice of elicitation technique is an impor­
tant concern given the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
interviews and surveys for the accuracy of information 
provided by users.  If analysts utilize interviews, they need to 
take measures to minimize introduction of the demand effect 
during requirements elicitation.  For example, using ethnog­
raphers trained in remaining neutral during requirements 
elicitation could be useful in reducing the demand effect as 
long as users do not regard them as systems development 
experts (Smith and Ellsworth 1987).  Further, probing using 
neutral questions, using feedback only to reward complete 
responses (not the content of responses), and not providing 
cues to users about how they should respond (Fowler 2009) 
could significantly reduce the misinformation effect. 
Analysts should also be careful when discussing opinions or 
indicating stances on topics during the early stages of eliciting 
requirements.  Although part of natural discourse between 
people, such information may inappropriately influence or 
mislead users.  At some point, the analyst typically must bring 
his knowledge of systems design into conversations with 
users to ensure feasibility of options and to manage user 
expectations appropriately.  However, this intertwining of 
analysis and design should ideally be left until as late in the 
elicitation process as possible.  In addition to unintentional 
introduction of misinformation, it may also be difficult to 
   
 
 


















control for misinformation introduced intentionally by 
analysts.  From an organizational standpoint, it may be 
desirable to use surveys for at least some portion of the IRD 
process, since both intentional and unintentional introduction 
of misinformation can be reduced with surveys. 
An argument can be made that judicious use of misinfor­
mation by analysts may lead to some positive outcomes. For 
example, analysts may provide inaccurate cues (intentionally 
or unintentionally) that cause users to think of ideas or 
alternatives or ways of looking at problems that they had not 
thought of before. Analysts may also intentionally employ 
misinformation to control “requirements creep,” in which the 
size of the project grows because of continual additions of 
new requirements (especially ones not absolutely necessary) 
by users.  In such a case, analysts may misinform users about 
constraints that limit such requirements.  Analysts may also 
intentionally provide misinformation to keep a project on 
schedule or on budget, which potentially adds value to the 
organization. However, in addition to ethical considerations 
involved in intentionally delivering misinformation, there are 
broader implications for systems development.  For example, 
who should have the ultimate power to decide upon and/or 
limit requirements?   If analysts use their expertise to mislead 
users into, say, believing that certain requirements cannot be 
fulfilled, is this in the best interests of the organization?
Does this tilt the power too far toward the IS group and away 
from users? These are both philosophical and practical ques­
tions that do not have easy answers. 
Another practical issue is that the nature of “users” has 
changed in some ways over the past few years.  For example, 
users may in some instances be characterized more accurately 
as “clients”—customers, potential customers, or suppliers— 
who may exert considerable control over the systems devel­
opment process in general and requirements determination in 
particular (e.g., Gulliksen et al. 2003; Kirsch et al. 2002; 
Mouakket et al. 1994).  Specific examples include companies 
(the users) that have outsourced or off-shored systems devel­
opment work to other firms (the analysts) (e.g., Sakthivel 
2007) and retailers such as Wal-Mart that directly influence 
aspects of the systems development of companies that supply 
them (e.g., Angeles 2005).  In such cases, clients may have 
substantial influence over the requirements elicitation process. 
However, even when user-clients direct the process, the 
analyst remains the person who must ultimately understand 
and model the requirements to build the system.  He thus 
retains some de facto control over the process in such cases. 
From a practical standpoint, the misinformation effect may 
still occur during analyst–user communication and negotiation 
processes despite these different systems development condi­
tions. With off-shoring, there may be the opportunity for 
misinformation (intentional or unintentional) to be introduced 
due to cultural differences and the physical distance between 
the analysts and clients.  With outsourcing, technical expertise 
may be leveraged by the outsourcing firm to introduce 
misinformation as part of increasing sales of features or 
system modules.  Thus, contemporary systems development 
practice, with its more diverse forms, still requires its actors 
to be vigilant concerning the misinformation effect. 
It also may be argued that flaws in information requirements 
caused by the misinformation effect can be corrected by other 
steps or strategies in the systems development process.  It is 
possible that structural strategies (such as asking users or 
analysts to play devil’s advocate or using more experienced 
users) or JAD sessions may make the misinformation effect 
less likely to occur, or that the requirements verification 
process (prior to design) or prototyping or testing may expose 
inaccurate requirements.  These are all empirical questions at 
this point.  We note, however, that if misinformation is 
introduced, memory impairment can cause the original infor­
mation to be overwritten, so it cannot be recalled later 
regardless of technique or number of iterations.  And, as 
noted, demand effects will also make the misinformation 
effect difficult to overcome. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has investigated the misinformation effect 
as a central issue in requirements elicitation efforts.  Since 
this is the first study to address this issue, there are some 
limitations that should be discussed.  However, given the 
presence of the misinformation effect in this context, the 
limitations of this study can also serve as fertile ground for 
further research. Participants in this study were regular users 
of the system, but were not domain experts.  Participants in 
actual IRD contexts may have differing levels of experience 
and/or expertise (they may have more or may have less than 
our participants), which may affect the results obtained. 
Therefore, examining whether experience and expertise 
moderate the influence of misinformation on the accuracy of 
requirements gathered could have important implications for 
participant selection strategies for IRD.  Also, this study did 
not investigate whether the misinformation effect is temporary 
or permanent.  If the effect is temporary, there may be miti­
gating strategies analysts can employ, such as introducing 
breaks during requirements elicitation sessions or gathering 
requirements over multiple sessions.  However, there is evi­
dence from other contexts that the misinformation effect is not 
temporary (e.g., Marsh et al. 2003), which would be expected 
considering that memory impairment is one of its causes. 






















the misinformation effect seems unlikely to disappear in IRD. 
Further, it is also worth noting that beliefs may be more or 
less malleable.  We did not measure strength of beliefs in the 
present research, but since our results suggest that both facts 
and beliefs are influenced by demand effects and memory 
impairment, strength of belief may make no difference. 
However, investigating the misinformation effect with more 
strongly held beliefs than those in the current study represents 
an interesting area for future research. 
Another important consideration is that the motivation levels 
of different organizational stakeholders are likely to range 
from quite low to quite high under various circumstances. 
Users whose jobs or work processes will change significantly 
may have higher motivation and greater focus than people 
whose work is peripherally affected.  Analysts working on 
higher priority systems development efforts may have higher 
motivation.  And systems that are critical to the mission or 
survival of the organization should command greater attention 
and focus than other systems. The system used in this study 
was not one for which failure would result in disastrous 
consequences. Although the student participants are real 
users of this system and have a stake in its proper functioning 
and planned upgrades, it must be acknowledged that both 
users and analysts may have greater motivation for a system 
controlling users’ personal security or one ensuring the proper 
functioning of a nuclear power plant.  In the present study, 
because of the random assignment of participants, we can 
assume that any motivational differences in participants were 
distributed evenly across treatment groups.  Nonetheless, 
future research investigating the impact of motivations of 
organizational stakeholders on the misinformation effect in 
IRD would be valuable. 
We also acknowledge that there is more complexity in the 
accuracy of requirements using interviews and surveys than 
we have captured in the present research.  For example, users 
responding to questions from an interviewer often do not have 
the luxury of thinking carefully and deliberately about a 
response before providing an answer. In addition, they are 
not likely to ask the analyst (interviewer) to repeat the ques­
tion on numerous occasions.  In contrast, as noted above, 
users responding to a survey may both think carefully and 
reread questions (although whether they do so in requirements 
elicitation settings is an empirical question).  In the present 
study, this factor may help explain the findings that surveys 
are somewhat more robust to the misinformation effect. 
An important area for future research concerns misinfor­
mation introduced into the IRD process by users.  Although 
we focused on analysts in the current research, users are 
typically the content experts for software applications and 
analysts must rely on them for accurate requirements. 
Misinformation introduced by users, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, is therefore a threat to requirements accuracy 
and successful systems development. For example, Gallivan 
and Keil (2003) and Markus and Benjamin (1997) discuss 
numerous reasons that users are not motivated to provide 
accurate requirements, including not wanting to challenge 
strong organizational assumptions and providing feedback on 
minor technical issues to mask their true desire not to change 
their work processes.  Thus, understanding user-introduced 
misinformation represents an important area for future 
investigations. 
Future research can also examine additional causes of the 
demand effect.  In the present research we investigated the 
demand effect as it has traditionally been used in the psych­
ology literature, in this case as a consequence of attempting 
to meet the expectations of an analyst who was in control of 
the process. In addition to this cause, there may be other 
factors that can induce the demand effect. For example, 
another potential factor is the perceived technical expertise of 
the analyst. Users may agree with the analyst’s suggestions 
during IRD because they view the analyst as an expert in 
systems development (see Lin and Silva 2005). In the context 
of eyewitness memory Smith and Ellsworth (1987) found that 
misinformation decreased witness accuracy when the ques­
tioner was assumed by the subject to be knowledgeable about 
the crime, but had no effect on accuracy when the questioner 
was assumed to be naïve.  Thus, if a systems analyst is 
perceived as particularly knowledgeable concerning the topic 
of interest, users may provide requirements consistent with 
those suggested by the analyst. Therefore, the results of the 
current experiment may underrepresent a typical demand 
effect when compared to traditional IS development settings. 
In organizational settings in which there is a larger perceived 
technical expertise gap between users and analysts, the likeli­
hood of analyst-introduced misinformation is expected to be 
higher. This is an empirical question worthy of additional 
research. 
Conclusion 
The present study has demonstrated that the misinformation 
effect is a significant threat to the accuracy of requirements 
gathered for organizational systems.  We have extended 
misinformation effect theory by showing the impact of the 
effect on factual and belief-related information learned 
experientially over time, and have found that misinformation 
introduced by analysts during IRD negatively influences the 
accuracy of requirements elicited.  The misinformation effect 

























tion. If information gathered is not accurate, the IRD process 
will fail and the misinformation will negatively affect the 
success of the full systems development and implementation 
process. We have introduced a new theoretical perspective to 
understand why requirements provided by users may not 
reflect their true knowledge or beliefs. It is important to 
realize that if analysts introduce misinformation during the 
requirements elicitation process, the requirements gathered 
are likely to be a reflection of what the analysts suggest rather 
than the true requirements of the users.  Further research into 
this important area of systems development is warranted. 
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